by Gerónimo Gutiérrez Fernández, Mexico’s Ambassador to the United States (2017-18), Undersecretary for Governance (2009-10), and Undersecretary for North America (2003-06).

For Mexico, the first days of the new Trump administration have transpired largely as expected with tough statements, threats of trade tariffs and a series of executive orders which, if not explicitly targeting the US southern neighbor, do affect it. Indeed, Mexico faces a complex review of the US, Mexico and Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA) intertwined with non-trade issues in the bilateral agenda, namely immigration, security and drug trafficking, as well as shifting geopolitics.  The United States, it seems clear, is not only seeking trading partners, but allies which are more clearly aligned politically in the new world scenario.

Out of President Trump’s many executive orders, one that has created special concern in Mexico is that which designates drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) – issued on day 1 of his administration. The idea had been previously put forward during Donald Trump’s first administration and in fact has been around since the Obama administration. It is also true that it has gained ground among relevant US political actors including through legislative bills and congressional resolutions supporting the measure, as a 2024 report by the Woodrow Wilson Mexico Institute describes.  

President Trump’s recent executive order in fact just kick-starts the designation process and the Secretary of State in coordination with other agencies is required to come up with recommendations within 14 days. As things stand today, it is not clear if one or more Mexican cartels will actually be designated as FTOs. In the meantime, a few points can help us to better understand what seems to be at stake.

For an FTO designation three general criteria must be met: the organization must be foreign, engage in or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorism, and threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests of the United States. There seems to be little debate on the legal case for designating Mexican cartels as FTOs. There is less consensus, however, on the effectiveness of this measure. In Mexico, authorities have always reacted quite negatively to the prospect basically for three reasons: the obvious effect on Mexico’s image worldwide, economic and financial side effects for two countries that are deeply integrated and, more importantly, fear that it would result in US unilateral military intervention in Mexico.

In Mexican political circles US military intervention is seen as an eminent consequence of the FTO designation. This notion does not appear to be precise. As suggested by some legal scholars, an FTO designation does not in itself authorize the US president to use military force outside the territory of the United States to conduct kinetic activity against the cartels. Neither the immigration code nor the drug code expressly authorizes such action. Moreover, unilateral US military intervention against the cartels in Mexico’s territory will undoubtedly result in an unprecedented and immediate deterioration of all security and military-to-military cooperation between Mexico and the United States. It would also send back by decades the overall bilateral relationship.

As suggested by some experts, putting a terrorist “label” on the cartels could certainly facilitate the prosecution of individuals who provide material support to designated groups as well as freezing assets linked to them. Yet, doubts persist on whether this step would provide more effective operational tools than the ones currently available to address the problem posed by cartels.

There are valid concerns about the potential side effects of this measure over the financial systems of both Mexico and the US. These effects would result, not only from additional prevention and compliance costs, but also from higher risks of penalties and prosecution due to financial transactions inadvertently linked to cartel activity. Also, multinational companies can become the subject of civil lawsuits in the US by alleged victims of these groups. Finally, not much analysis has been given to the potential response by the cartels and the implications.   

The designation of cartels as FTOs lends itself to the bravado of President Trump. The fentanyl crisis is real, unprecedented, and serious. However, doubts about the effectiveness of FTOs should not obscure the fact the Mexico has been unable to deal successfully with drug cartels, nor that the U.S – Mexico security and law enforcement cooperation is not now at par with challenge posed by transnational organized crime.

Under the last three administrations, the Mexican government has strived to label cartel activity as nothing more than financially-driven organized crime. The suggestion that cartels have morphed into anything close to insurgency, guerrilla, or terrorism results in immediate pushback. As I have suggested before, the Mexican government should give more careful consideration to the fact that cartels pose more than a threat to public security. This threat at least reflects key elements of an asymmetric conflict. In this vein, a relatively overlooked element of Trump’s executive order is that it states international cartels posed a threat beyond that of traditional organized crime, with convergence with extra-hemispheric actors and engaged in insurgency and asymmetric warfare.

Security and law enforcement cooperation is far too valuable for Mexico and the United States to be damaged by unilateral actions from any side, especially if the expected results are uncertain. Cooperation can only really work if it is based on shared responsibility, fluid coordination, trust and a comprehensive shared assessment of logic, operations and threats posed by cartels. Cool heads should prevail on both sides.